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[Abstract] 
Regulating bunker emissions continues to be a challenging task, largely due to the lack of a 
globally coordinated scheme providing economic and political incentives to potential 
participating countries. This paper analyses the economic costs and benefits of imposing a 
global carbon tax on international bunker emissions by employing a computable general 
equilibrium model approach. Under the assumption of an emissions reduction of 5 percent 
below 2000 levels by 2020, we demonstrate that a global bunker emissions charge, on one 
hand, reduces trade volume and change trade patterns between countries and regions, while 
on the other hand, accelerates the adoption of energy-saving technologies and reallocates the 
supply of international transportation services throughout the world. The net economic 
impact, though negative on average, is modest compared to the benefits obtained from the 
emissions reduction. If revenues from a bunker emissions charge are properly distributed 
among countries and regions, the losses to disadvantaged countries are likely to be offset by 
the benefits to advantaged countries. This finding provides useful insights for policy makers: 
a global bunker emissions charge could, in future, be an economically feasible strategy to 
reduce the increasing bunker emissions though the implementation requires more political 
effort and wisdom.   
Key Words:  Bunker Emissions Charge; International Maritime Transport; Economic and 
Trade Impact; CGE Model. 
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Negative net economic impact is unevenly distributed, but modest compared to emissions 
reduction benefits  
Revenue distribution arrangements is important for the success of a bunker charge’s 
implementation. 
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1. Introduction
To reduce the carbon emissions from the international transport industry sector, rigorous analysis 
of the economic impacts of a global bunker emissions charge under a global policy framework 
and coordination scheme is essential. Due to the rapid expansion of international trade in recent 
decades, international aviation and shipping services have significantly increased their 
*Manuscript
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consumption of bunker fuels — mainly fossil fuels — and have concomitantly greatly increased 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2005, emissions resulting from the combustion of 
bunker fuels by the international aviation and shipping industries were estimated to have 
accounted for about 2.1 percent of global GHG emissions and 2.7 percent of global carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA, 2009). While the contribution of the international transport 
industry sector to global GHG emissions increased to only 2.4 percent between 2007 and 2012 
(IMO, 2014), this proportion is expected increase to around 17 percent by 2050 if no action is 
taken to reduce the emissions (European Parliament, 2015).  
 
Although the steady increase in the bunker emissions has gradually aroused public concern, there 
seems to be a global consensus that the notion of “environmental externality” prevents these 
emissions from being included in the national inventory of GHG emissions for any individual 
country (IMF, 2016; Lee et al., 2013; Shi, 2016). Bunker emissions are generated from mobile 
sources and are therefore emitted across national borders and throughout international airspace 
and waters. To correct for this environmental externality, an effective bunker emissions charge 
must be designed on the basis of a global framework and coordination scheme (Psaraftis, 2012). 
On one hand, a global bunker emissions charge, irrespective of whether a country supplying the 
service has priced carbon in its domestic market, will prevent transportation companies from rent 
seeking —  creating hubs in exempt nations to avoid the surcharge (Australian Government, 
2008). On the other hand, implementing a global bunker emissions charge will raise funds to 
support international cooperation in the development and transfer of cleaner technologies (i.e. 
solar energy) between developed and developing countries and reduce carbon emissions.  
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While efforts have been devoted to establishing a mechanism for international cooperation in the 
control of bunker emissions, the emissions are still unpriced at a global level due to the lack of a 
globally enforceable scheme (Australian Government, 2008). For example, the Kyoto Protocol 
requires that developed countries must reduce, by working through international organizations, 
the emissions associated with the consumption of bunker fuels (UNFCCC, 1998). However, 
bunker emissions steadily increased by more than 50 percent from 1998 to 2007 (European 
Parliament, 2015). The challenge is how to gain universal support from all the potential 
participants, especially developing countries which are more likely to be disadvantaged, and 
those countries that are far from their trading partners.  
 
To implement a global bunker emissions charge, it is essential to provide economic incentives to 
the potential participants. Thus, analyzing the impact of a global framework and its distribution 
across countries, from an economic perspective, is critical not only in policy debates, but is also 
important in the academic literature. Theoretically, extending the global carbon-emissions 
control framework to cover a bunker emissions charge, on one hand, will increase the cost of 
transporting goods and international travel. This may reduce and divert the demand for imported 
goods and thereby change global trade patterns — particularly for bulky commodities. On the 
other hand, imposing the bunker emissions charge may alter the supply of global international 
transportation services between countries, change the use of different types of bunker fuels, and 
affect the adoption of energy-saving transportation technologies, thereby affecting economic 
growth across regions. The net economic effects of implementing an emissions reduction policy 
and its cross-regional distribution are ambiguous and are subject to strictly empirical scrutiny. 
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This paper employs a dynamic global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, namely the 
Global Trade Environmental Model (GTEM), to quantify the economic impacts of imposing a 
global bunker emissions charge by 2030. In addition, we also discuss whether a global emissions 
charge could become a boon to all potential participants if the revenue from the bunker charge is 
properly distributed among countries and regions to offset the potential losses to the 
disadvantaged participants, in particular those from the developing world. The purpose here, 
therefore, is to assess the feasibility of a global bunker emissions charge from an economic 
perspective, though we recognize that the implementation of a framework would require 
considerable political effort and wisdom.
1
  
 
We show that a global bunker emissions charge may incur only limited economic and trade costs 
and be economically feasible and desirable relative to the benefits from emissions reduction and 
revenue collection. It also shows that a global bunker emissions charge with proper redistribution 
arrangements could even out the economic impact across countries, thus providing the 
supportive evidence for a non-differential treatment principle in reducing bunker emission.  
 
Our paper makes at least two contributions to the literature. First, it is a pioneer study which 
quantifies the economic effects of implementing a global bunker emissions charge and its cross-
country distribution from a general equilibrium perspective. The existing literature focuses 
mainly on using regression analysis to investigate, from various angles, the social benefits of a 
                                                 
1
 It is important that a bunker emissions charge be universally applied irrespective of whether the country supplying 
the service has priced carbon in its domestic market in order to prevent transportation companies from rent seeking 
by creating hubs in exempt nations so as to avoid the charge (Climate Works 2009). 
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mitigation policy, while ignoring its general equilibrium effects. Nor do the previous studies 
account for the inequalities that a global bunker emissions charge would generate between 
countries and regions, which could discourage the participation of disadvantaged economies. 
 
 Our study investigates the economic impact of a bunker emissions charge by using a dynamic 
CGE model to assess its general equilibrium effects and the cross-regional distribution to inform 
policy making. It also provides useful insights for the policy debate on how to make a global 
policy scheme feasible in practice. Specifically, it points to the use of a revenue redistribution 
tool to reduce cross-regional disparity, compensate for the losses and encourage participation. In 
practice, there are increasing concerns about the use of the non-differential treatment principle as 
the policy base to manage the international transportation industry. However, since a global 
bunker emissions charge is likely to generate asymmetric costs for different countries and 
regions (mainly, developing countries), it will discourage their participation.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the debate over the relevant 
economic, environmental and political issues. Section 3 describes the attributes of the dynamic 
CGE model in this study, which enable us to analyze the net economic impact of a global bunker 
emissions charge and its cross-country disparity. The policy scenarios, modelling sensitivities 
and data sources are also provided. Sections 4 and 5 present the model simulation results and 
discuss the impact of imposing a bunker emissions charge on international trade, 
competitiveness/comparativeness and the social welfare of individual participants. Concluding 
comments and recommendations are provided in Section 6.  
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2. Regulating Bunker Emissions: Policies and Literature 
Aviation and maritime shipping activities are critical elements of global trade and business, and 
nowadays more than 90 percent of commodity trade is transported by sea or by air (ICS, 2014; 
Monkelbaan, 2010). Due to global economic growth, this rapidly expanding sector has 
significantly increased its consumption of fossil fuels in recent decades, making it an important 
source of GHG emissions. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) process, the share of emissions from bunker fuels has been raised since the first 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in 1995. Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol 
mandates that developed countries (or Annex I countries) limit or reduce their GHG emissions 
(not controlled by the Montreal Protocol) resulting from the consumption of aviation and marine 
bunker fuels. To facilitate implementation of this protocol, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were authorized to 
undertake various policies and measures to reduce GHG emissions resulting from the 
combustion of aviation and marine bunker fuels, respectively (UNFCCC, 1998).  
 
To date, the IMO and ICAO have generally considered two typical policies to reduce bunker 
emissions: market-based measures (MBMs) and technical and operational measures (mainly 
efficiency requirements) (Psaraftis, 2012). Over the past two decades, the IMO has been 
successful in implementing technical and operational measures. The Energy Efficiency Design 
Index (EEDI) for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Plan (SEEMP) for all ships were 
introduced in 2011 and became effective on 1 January 2013 (IMO, 2017).  By contrast, the IMO 
has not implemented a MBM to control bunker emissions from the shipping industry. The 
discussions on MBMs and related issues were suspended after the 65
th
 session of the IMO 
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Marine Environment Protection Committee due to controversies surrounding the distribution of 
costs and benefits among countries (Shi, 2016).  
 
Restriction of GHG emissions from the international transportation sector is essential to reduce 
global carbon emissions, but difficult. It is widely believed that ‘applying operational 
measures and implementing advanced engine technologies could lead up to 75 percent savings in 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions’  (IMO, 2009b). However, it remains a challenging task 
to enforce the adoption of energy-saving technologies and regulate the emissions of the 
international transportation sector in practice. This is because fossil fuels (or bunker fuels) 
consumed by the international transport sector do not belong to any country and cannot be 
accounted for in emission reductions unilaterally (IMF, 2016). The regulation of bunker 
emissions is also more challenging than the technical and operational measures due to a lack of 
economic incentives for shipping operators (as the bunker fuel change may increase operation 
costs) and thus requires intensive international cooperation under a global climate policy 
framework. 
 
Given the difficulties  in reaching an agreement on international marine emissions regulations, 
various alternatives have been proposed, such as the Vessel Efficiency System, Port State Levy 
(IMO, 2017; Psaraftis, 2012), and a unilateral limit for all ships entering European Union (EU) 
ports (Cariou and Cheaitou, 2012). The EU is calling for a global approach to reducing the GHG 
emissions caused by international shipping and plans to require that large ships using EU ports 
must report their verified annual emissions and other relevant information from 2018 (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2015). There are also discussions underway on 
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country-specific policies that could lead to reduced shipping emissions (Gilbert and Bows, 2012). 
As an interim measure, the IMO has gained members’ support to develop a global data collection 
system to measure CO2 emissions from individual ships (ICS, 2014). However, none of the 
aforementioned can replace a global climate policy framework.  
 
A global carbon tax regime that facilitates the implementation of MBMs has long been under 
discussion. The shipping industry prefers a mechanism linked to fuel consumption, rather than a 
system based on emissions trading, since the latter will cause additional complications in the 
calculation of emissions (ICS, 2014). In January 2016, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) called for a global carbon tax scheme on shipping and aviation with the aim of 
raising public resources for climate finance. Differing from other proposals, the proposed tax 
framework paid additional attention to the bunker charge revenues and their use for 
compensating developing countries. The IMF argued that approximately US$25 billion could 
have been raised in 2014 with a global tax of US$30 per ton of CO2 applied to these fuels (IMF, 
2016).  
 
Developing countries and island countries have raised two concerns regarding the 
implementation of a bunker emissions charge. First, developing countries are worried about the 
potential unfair burden placed on their economic development. For example, Brazil and India 
argued that a proposed MBM under the IMO would not be compatible with the UNFCCC 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and would impede food security 
in developing countries (IMO, 2014). Second, the disbursement of revenue remains a 
controversial issue although there was a general preference that the greater part of any funds 
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generated by an MBM under the support of the IMO should be used for climate change adaption 
and mitigation purposes in developing countries (IMO, 2009a). This is because there is conflict 
between the IMO approach of universal application and the CBDR principle of UNFCCC. In 
sum, the IMO members cannot reach a consensus on an MBM until the potential economic 
impact of implementation and its cross-country distribution are understood. This reflects the 
compelling need of further studies.  
 
However, there are yet only a few studies examining the impact of various global policy 
measures for reducing international bunker emissions. For example, Psaraftis and Kontovas 
(2010) studied the implications of various emissions reductions policies for maritime 
transportation and identified the trade-off between environmental performance and economic 
costs. Miola et al. (2011) conducted an in-depth analysis of various proposed policy instruments 
designed to reduce the emissions, focusing on economic theory, legal principles and 
technological options. They concluded that permits should be auctioned frequently, emissions 
trading should spare small emitters, and inclusion of shipping in the EU Emission Trading 
System (ETS) causes carbon leakage. Franc and Sutto (2014) explored the potential impacts of a 
cap-and-trade system on the organisation of containerised shipping lines and European ports. 
Wang (2010) estimated the economic costs of reduceing shipping emissions for non-Annex 
countries with a focus on the common but diffierential principal and found that small island 
countries were more likely to be affected by increasing shipping costs.  
 
Unlike any of the previous studies, this paper attempts to fill this gap by assessing the global 
impact of a bunker emissions charge with a customized dynamic CGE model. In particular, we 
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propose to answer questions such as: how much could a global bunker emissions charge 
negatively affect world trade and economic development? To what extent could a MBM 
disadvantage consumers and industries in developing countries that often export low value bulky 
commodities (IMO, 2014)? Moreover, if an MBM is to generate adverse impacts, would it be 
more serious for countries situated in remote locations and with high levels of trade dependence, 
such as some Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (Monkelbaan, 2010)? 
 
Our study is also related to another strand of literature which used CGE models to support 
energy and environment policy analysis in areas such as taxation, subsidies, market reform, 
technology spillover, regional cooperation, and others (Araar et al., 2011; C and Kelly DL, 2012; 
Carbone and Kerry, 2013; Sue Wing, 2009). These studies mainly focused on the national GHG 
inventory in evaluationg the impacts of carbon pricing mechnisms. See, for example, Goulder 
(1995) on the United States’ carbon tax, Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) on Germany’s carbon 
tax, Allen Consulting Group (2006) on Australia’s carbon tax, Allan et al. (2014) on Scotland’s 
carbon tax, Alton et al. ( 2014) on South Africa’s carbon tax and Liu Y and Lu Y (2015) on 
China’s carbon tax. Some recent studies apply the static multi-region CGE model to study 
transport related emissions. For example, Abrell J (2000) analyses the impacts of market-based 
regulation instruments on transportation CO2 reductions; Lee et al. (2013) evaluate the economy-
wide impact of a carbon tax on international container shipping for world countries; and Lee et al. 
(2016) investigate Asian economic integration and its impacts on martime CO2 emissions. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have used a dynamic multi-region 
CGE model for worldwide countries and have therefore not been able to estimate the economy 
wide impact of a bunker emissions charge or levy.  
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3. Model Framework: GTEM 
In this paper, we employ the Global Trade and Environment Model (GTEM) to quantify the 
economic impacts of imposing a global bunker emissions charge on major countries and regions. 
What follows is a brief description of the model features related to analyzing a global bunker 
emissions charge, followed by a discussion on how to develop alternative scenarios to quantify 
the economic impacts of imposing a global bunker emissions charge and a review of the main 
data sources.  
 
3.1 Model Settings 
GTEM is a multi-country, multi-sectoral, recursively dynamic CGE model of the world economy 
that is widely used to analyze policy issues with global implications, such as global trade policy 
changes and issues that involve long time horizons such as climate change mitigation. The core 
model consists of well-designed modules defining the production, consumption and trade of each 
commodity in each country and also the international transportation sector, as documented in 
Pant (2007).  
 
The model can be used to analyze the global bunker emissions charge because it details the GHG 
emissions mechanism from the international transportation service sectors that accounts for 
major fuels and sources, allows for technology substitution and uptake of backstop technologies, 
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and incorporates various climate change response policies. For simplicity, we offer a brief 
discussion of the model setting with a focus on international transportation sector. 
 
In the current model setting, there are 13 regions plus an area of ‘international waters’, and all 
commodities and services are categorized into 21 commodity groups (Table 1). ‘International 
waters’ are a hypothetical region where global traders operate and use international shipping 
services to ship goods from one region to the other. The global transport sector operates in 
‘international waters’, and is separated from the domestic transportation sector. It receives its 
income from global traders who transport the merchandise from source regions to their 
respective destinations. 
 
Table 1: GTEM regional and commodity disaggregation 
Regions Commodities 
United States Coal 
European Union 25 (EU25) Oil 
China Gas 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) Petroleum and Coal Products 
Japan Electricity 
India Iron and Steel 
Canada Non-ferrous Metals 
Australia Chemicals, Rubbers and Plastics 
Indonesia Other Mining 
South Africa Non-metallic Minerals 
Other Southeast Asian Countries (Other 
SEA) Manufacturing 
OPEC Other Transport 
Rest of world (ROW) Domestic Water Transport 
 Domestic Air Transport 
 Crops 
 Livestock 
 Forestry and Fisheries 
 Food 
 Services 
 International Water Transport  
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 International Air transport  
Source: GTAP Model. 
 
To provide the service, the global transport sector purchases transport commodities from various 
regions and pays the regions for the supplies of actual inputs (including capital, labor and fossil 
fuel). The demand for inputs from regions by the international shipping industry is derived by 
minimizing the cost subject to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. A 
constant elasticity of substitution between regional supplies of each primary factor input (such as 
labor and capital) and energy-factor inputs to the global transport sector is used to determine the 
response of the supply from different countries. 
 
The cost (or revenue) of international transport is added to the cost of imports to each country. 
The demand for international transport is proportional to the quantity of goods transported from 
one region to the other. In other words, the percentage change in demand for transport service for 
goods transported between any two regions is set equal to the percentage change in the quantity 
of the commodity transported. This relation is also determined by technological changes in the 
international transportation sectors, captured by various productivity parameters for 
transportation technological progress. The total demand for international transport services is the 
sum of the demand for transport services induced by exports of all commodities along all 
possible routes. 
 
The zero-profit condition for these global transportation sectors implies that the cost of supplying 
the margin transportation services should be equal to the revenue received from employing the 
service in transporting the merchandise. 
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In this sense, the model in use here differs from the GTAP model and other general equilibrium 
models by providing a transparent mechanism to link energy consumption to the production of 
international transportation services. Thus, it can be used to analyze issues such as the impacts of 
a global bunker emissions charge on international trade and social and economic welfare, as well 
as the uptake of new technologies, throughout the world. 
 
Finally, the fossil fuels consumed by the international water and air transport sectors, are defined 
as bunker fuels and are identified by using the commodity level information on coal and 
petroleum oil (including heavy oils). It is worth noting that the outputs of international water and 
air transport sectors are both used for transporting goods from one region to the other.
2
 In this 
sense, these two sectors are both international margin sectors and there could be a switch in 
demand between the two sectors according to their relative price. 
 
Based on the model setting of the international transport sectors, an emissions charge on bunker 
fuel will generate a general equilibrium impact on the global economy from three perspectives: 
(a) the bunker charge will decrease demand for international transportation and thus reduce trade 
because it increases transportation costs. (b) the bunker charge will change the relative supply of 
the international transportation services from each region through affecting the price of bunker 
fuels and thus the cost minimization process for each region to supply the international 
transportation services. (c) the bunker charge will alter the structure of demand and supply for 
                                                 
2
 In CGE models, the international transportation sectors are always assumed to be margin sectors which are used to 
absorb the gap between imports and exports in statistics. 
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international transportation services, since different countries/regions have different 
transportation technologies and different prices for bunker fuels. 
 
3.2 Scenarios for Simulations 
The model simulation is run under certain scenarios to investigate the economic impacts of 
imposing a global bunker emissions charge. The baseline scenario assumes that the bunker 
emissions charge is implemented via a uniform global carbon charge rather than emissions 
trading. This assumption helps to avoid issues arising from inappropriate initial quota allocation 
before international emissions trading is allowed between countries.  
 
Specifically, the basic scenario assumes that all countries implement an ad-value bunker 
emissions charge from 2010 (18 US$/ton-CO2) in a staged manner across regions as described in 
the Australia Low Pollution Future Report (Garnaut, 2008). The basic scenario follows the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme-5 (CPRS-5) scenario, which assumes a slower start to 
global emissions reductions and stabilization at 550 ppm and Australia’s medium-term target at 5 
percent below 2000 levels by 2020. Under this scenario, the global carbon charge on bunker 
emissions is assumed to grow at around 4 percent a year. Moreover, the bunker emissions charge 
revenues collected in all countries are assumed to be pooled and distributed back to developing 
countries in proportion to their share of imports in global trade, while the shares that may accrue 
to the developed countries are then distributed back to the developing countries in proportion to 
their share in the total population and their efforts in reducing bunker emissions. For comparison, 
two alternative scenarios are also developed based on different assumptions with respect to 
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emissions accounting methods by flag (i.e. the developed countries flag to impose the bunker 
charge first, followed by the developing countries) and by harbor of destinations/origins.  
 
To split the impact of the global bunker emissions charge from other macroeconomic shocks, we 
simulate the model twice under each scenario — once without the bunker emissions charge (or 
the reference case) and the other with the bunker emissions charge (or the comparison case). The 
comparison between the outcomes obtained from these two runs for each scenario provides a 
measure of the relative economic impacts of including bunker emissions in the purview of a 
bunker emissions charge on global carbon emissions reduction, a bunker emissions charge on 
revenue collection, global trade amount and patterns, and the competitiveness of different 
commodities in major countries and regions.  
 
Besides the basic scenarios, two more sets of scenarios are designed to examine whether the net 
impacts of imposing a global bunker emissions charge will change with the assumed carbon 
charge path, variations in bunker fuel prices and the method used to re-distribute the bunker 
charges revenue between countries. 
 
Impact on carbon charge path: To test this issue, we run the model under the same global 
environment as in the basic scenario, but with two different starting carbon emissions charges. 
The first is about 40 percent higher than the starting carbon charge under the basic scenario (i.e. 
25 US$/ton-CO2), the second is about 45 percent lower (i.e. 10 US$/ton-CO2). The higher carbon 
charge reflects the carbon charge under the CPRS-15 scenario (Australian Government, 2008), 
while the lower carbon charge reflects the case when there is little progress in international 
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cooperation on developing a universal global framework under the CPRS-5 scenario. In both 
cases, the model is simulated twice, with and without applying the global carbon charge to 
bunker emissions. These two sets are referred to as high and low carbon charge scenarios. 
  
Impact of revenue redistribution: How the revenues collected from the bunker emissions charge 
is redistributed among countries and regions matters for the simulation results. In current policy 
debates, some argue that the countries which collect the revenues should have more allocations 
so as to give the incentive to implementation, while others argue that the service providers 
should get more allocation since they have undertaken the largest proportion of the costs 
associated with providing the services. Alternatively, it is argued that the revenue should be 
evenly distributed between countries for the purpose of fairness. A comparison of the simulation 
results obtained from these alternative options with the baseline model can provide the guidance 
on which option would be more beneficial to the world as whole and also give more incentives to 
potential participants.  
 
Impact of changing global oil prices: It is widely acknowledged that the international shipping 
industry is moving from using heavy fuel oils (HFO) to marine gas oil (MGO) under the 
MARPOL Annex VI regulations. Since there are uncertainties about future global oil prices in 
general and MGO prices, the model simulation without accounting for possible change in global 
bunker fuel price will generate significant bias. To deal with this problem, we incorporate two 
additional possible price scenarios, derived from the estimates developed by the IMO Expert 
Group on Market Based Measures (IMO, 2014). The first price scenario assumes a low-price 
projection; the second price scenario assumes a high price path. Still, the baseline scenario was 
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run with a reference marine fuel price as well to evaluate the sensitivity of our model outcomes 
to various possible marine fuel prices.
3
  
 
Piecing everything together, we use 12 scenarios in total running in 3 sets to include 3 baseline 
scenarios, 3 scenarios for accessing the revenue distribution arrangements and 6 scenarios for the 
trajectory test (Table 2). All scenarios were simulated over the period spanning 2010 to 2030. 
The global bunker emissions charge in the baseline scenario was implemented in line with the 
assumptions underlying the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 2008) scenario that the 
global GHG emissions by 2020 will decrease to 5 percent lower than the 2000 level. All 
developed countries were assumed to introduce a carbon charge in 2010, while developing 
countries were assumed to introduce a carbon charge progressively from 2015 onwards. By 2025 
all countries are participating fully. However, it is further assumed that bunker fuels purchased in 
all regions, whether the region has taken up the global carbon charge or not, are subjected to the 
bunker emissions charge from the year 2010.  
 
Table 2: Summary of scenarios for model simulation 
Set Scenarios  Description 
 
Baseline 
Baseline scenario 
(CPRS-5 as 
Benchmark) 
an ad-value global bunker emissions charge 
from 2010 (18 US$/ton-CO2) 
Revenue collection By flag Bunker emissions charge is collected by flag 
By harbor of 
destination/origin  
Bunker emissions charge is collected by 
harbors of destination or origin 
Revenue distribution  Full refund Redistributing revenue according to the 
revenue collection 
                                                 
3
 The results are reported in Appendix A. 
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Developing countries 
sharing 
Redistributing revenue only to the developing 
countries according to their trade share 
Evenly distributed Redistributing revenue to all countries and 
regions evenly 
Carbon charge 
path/global oil price 
change 
(sensitivity test) 
(Presented in 
Appendix) 
High/low carbon 
charge scenarios 
40 percent higher vs. 45 percent lower;  
High/low price path Extreme high/low oil price  
High/low trajectory 
test 
High (low) trajectory 
Note: In each scenario, both the reference and comparison cases are run and the difference is 
considered the impact. 
 
3.3 Data Sources  
The data used in this paper are mainly from three sources. The first group of data is used to 
calibrate the GTEM model: the data for trade and production are primarily from the GTAP 
database; the data on energy consumption and emissions are estimated using the country-specific 
national account statistics on the production and consumption of energy products to feed the 
GTEM model.  
 
The second group of data is used to construct the scenarios for a “bunker charge”. The estimates 
were made based on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme scenario that stipulates an 
emissions reduction of 5 percent below 2000 levels. The data used for this purpose is mainly 
from the Australian Treasure Estimates: “Australia’s low pollution future: the economics of 
climate change mitigation”. Please refer to the CSIRO (2008) and Commonwealth of Australia 
(2008) for a detailed methodology and the data sources used in these estimates. The third group 
of data is related to other descriptive statistics which come from different data sources including 
the IEA (2009), UNFCCC (2015), etc.  
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Three specific features of the data collection are required to be mentioned as below. First, the 
GTEM emissions database was expanded to identify and include emissions associated with 
bunker fuels. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, the standard version of the GTEM database 
excludes bunker fuel related emissions. In this paper, we start with the simulation from 2009 (the 
same base year as for the standard GTEM database) and shift it to 2015 to reflect the real 
practice. Then, we allocate these emissions to the international water and air transport sectors in 
proportion to their fuel usage. 
 
Second, the scheduled change in bunker fuel standards, from HFO to MGO, is essential to our 
simulation and is therefore included in this modelling exercise in an indirect way. We used this 
approach because the fuel types are not separately identified in the GTEM commodity groups. 
All bunker fuels are grouped into petroleum and coal products. The progressive change to MGO, 
which is designed to reduce mainly sulfur emissions from bunker fuel combustion, will increase 
the unit cost of marine fuel by 215 percent between 2010 and 2030. These standards are assumed 
to be fully implemented by 2020, however the price of MGO is projected to rise over the entire 
projection period to 2030. Since a bunker emissions charge has no impact on GHG emissions or 
fuel efficiency, these features have been incorporated in this modelling exercise by increasing the 
user levies on bunker fuels and the purchase of petroleum and coal products by the international 
water transport sector, so that the user price in the business as usual case rises to reflect the 
change in standard. 
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Third, the economic effects of the bunker emissions charge will be determined by assumptions 
pertaining to the distribution of the revenues arising from the bunker emissions charge. Even 
under the basic scenario that the revenues should be distributed in a way which is favorable to 
developing countries, it could be treated in different ways. In our exercise, we choose to 
redistribute the revenue in proportion to the share of their imports relative to all imports of 
Annex I countries. This assumption reflects, in a simplistic way, a policy where revenues from a 
bunker emissions charge are used to partly compensate for the possible adverse impacts of a 
bunker emissions charge on developing countries and partly to support adaptation and mitigation 
efforts in developing countries. 
 
4. Mechanism and Impact of a Global Bunker Emissions Charge  
Using the basic scenario, we simulate the model with both the reference and the comparison 
assumptions. The difference in the two baseline simulations (i.e. with or without a global bunker 
emissions charge) therefore yields its likely impact on emissions reduction, revenue collection 
and economic/trade outcome. For the other two scenarios associated with imposing the charge by 
flag or by destinations/origins, the comparison is made only with the reference case (e.g. without 
a global bunker emissions charge). All results in the following section should be interpreted as 
the relative impact of charging bunker emissions to the basic scenario.  
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4.1 Emission Reduction and Revenue Collection 
To examine its economic effects, we first run the simulation with and without imposing the price 
shock resulting from the bunker charge. Global bunker emissions are projected to decline with 
the implementation of a bunker emissions charge for three reasons. The main reason is that the 
implementation of this charge will first push up air and sea freight costs and in turn reduce the 
demand for bunker fuels and the related GHG emissions, or the ‘output reduction’ effects. 
Thereafter, the relative supply of international transportation services between these margin 
sectors and across countries and the associated bunker fuel consumption will shift towards the 
sectors and countries/regions with the relatively lower input costs under the bunker emissions 
charge and with a relatively quick adoption of energy-saving technologies, or the ‘supply 
adjustment’ effects. In the long-term equilibrium, a dynamic adjustment in investment will also 
help to improve the energy consumption efficiency of international transportation sectors 
throughout the world, or the ‘technological progress’ effects, though the impact through this 
channel is indirect and relatively small compared to the former two effects. 
 
Figure 1: Global bunker emissions under the basic scenario 
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Note: the model result is presented as the relative change from the baseline scenario without a 
bunker emissions charge. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the projected decrease of global bunker emissions relative to the baseline 
scenario. In the first year of implementation (or 2010), bunker emissions fall by 3.6 percent, 
mainly by output reduction effects. In subsequent years, the rate of decline is moderated because 
the carbon charge rises only by 4 percent per year, and thus the subsequent changes in the price 
of imported commodities are not as high as in the first year. However, the accumulated effects in 
carbon emissions reduction continues to increase due to the supply adjustment effects and 
technological progress effects. By 2030, bunker emissions fall by an estimated 5.2 percent 
relative to the emissions for that year in the CPRS–5 scenario without the bunker emissions 
charge. It is worth emphasizing that these reductions are relative to the reference case.  
 
Along with the reduction in bunker emissions, another benefit obtained from imposing a global 
bunker emissions charge is the revenue generated. Figure 2 provides estimates of the revenues 
from the bunker emissions charge collected by all regions in 2030. That year, an estimated 
US$75 billion (in 2001 dollars) throughout the world could be collected from the tax on bunker 
emissions, compared to the estimate of US$19 billion in 2010. The three-fold increase in the 
revenues from the bunker emissions charge over the 20 years is partly explained by the 4 percent 
annual growth in the charge rate and the growth of bunker fuel consumption arising from 
increased international transport services for goods. 
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Figure 2: Collection of bunker revenue by region in 2030 under the basic scenario (Unit: US 
$billion at 2001 prices) 
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4.2 Trade Volume Reduction and Diversion 
A bunker emissions charge is expected to incur economic costs for participating countries 
through the reduction in export and import volumes and diversion of trade between countries. 
These effects are generated through the effect of the bunker emissions charge raising freight 
costs and inducing a backward and forward shifting of the charge to alter the prices of importing 
and exporting commodities via the domestic production process. The shifting of the bunker 
emissions charge to exporters and importers and across all other market participants follows a 
general equilibrium process depending on the complex interaction of elasticities of supply and 
demand for all commodities and primary inputs. However, in the first order, the price elasticity 
of demand for imports and the price elasticity in the supply chain (and particularly which 
producers of exporting commodities are included) will explain a large part of the adjustment 
process.  
 
Generally, the implementation of a bunker emissions charge is like an additional tariff that is 
differentiated by commodity and source. At first, it raises the cost of importing commodities 
from overseas and therefore encourages domestic production as substitutes. As the import 
substitution sector expands its production, prices of primary inputs (e.g. land, labor and natural 
resources) tend to increase due to intensified competition in factor markets. This in turn raises 
the costs to produce other commodities and thus pushes up the price of exporting commodities. 
Although the mechanism is transparent, the magnitude of the net impact depends on the overall 
change in import prices, primary input prices and the responsiveness of other commodities to 
input prices (in response to the bunker emissions charge). In addition, when facing the relatively 
higher transportation costs due to the bunker emissions charge, exporters, importers and 
domestic producers will also minimize the transportation and production costs by adopting the 
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relatively more energy-efficient transportation methods and energy-saving technologies, which 
in turn help to offset the losses associated with the bunker emissions charge in the long run. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the net impacts of the bunker emissions charge on average import and export 
prices across countries under the baseline scenario. As expected in our model, import prices 
faced by all countries increase as a result of imposing the bunker emissions charge. This is due to 
the need for consumers to pay a certain proportion of the increased costs associated with 
transporting goods from overseas, even though the supply response may compensate for some 
costs. Moreover, increased import prices transfer into additional demand for domestic substitutes, 
which in turn increases the price of primary inputs and thus the production costs of exporting 
commodities.  
 
As in Figure 3, export prices in most countries increased after imposing a bunker emissions 
charge, but the highest increase (in Japan) was still below 0.5 percent. As for the three exception 
countries including Australia, China, and Indonesia, they all shared a common feature, namely 
they faced relatively fewer constraints in the supply of primary inputs and lower export demand 
elasticities.  
 
Figure 3: Responses of export and import prices to a bunker emissions charge under the basic 
scenario in 2030 
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Note: the change is expressed as the logarithm of change from the baseline scenario without a 
bunker emissions charge. 
 
The average rise in import prices faced by each region were simulated to be 0.2 percent higher 
by 2030 than they would be without the bunker emissions charge. In addition, changes to export 
prices in 10 of the 13 regions were smaller than those of import prices. This implies that the 
impact of imposing a bunker emissions charge on import and exports prices is not significant. 
 
As the bunker emissions charge raises import and export prices, it will reduce average trade 
volume between countries. As shown in Figure 4, import and export volumes for all countries are 
projected to decline when the bunker emissions charge is imposed. As with the impact of the 
bunker emissions charge on import and export prices, the impact on import volumes was 
generally larger than that on export volume (though both of the declines were less than 0.4 
percent).    
 
Figure 4: Responses of export and import volume to a bunker emissions charge under the basic scenario in 2030 
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Note: the change is expressed as the logarithm of change from baseline scenario without a 
bunker emissions charge. 
 
In addition to affecting the price and volume of trade, the bunker emissions charge could also 
divert trade between commodities and across regions. The key reason is that the emissions 
charge is based on bunker fuel consumption, and the transport of different commodities between 
different regions has different intensities in bunker fuel consumption. In addition, the 
substitutability in alternative ways of transportation, the response of technological progress in 
improving energy use efficiency, and the choice of imports and exports of substitutes from other 
regions also vary between commodities and across regions. As such, the bunker emissions 
charge will change the trade patterns of different commodities between regions in a complex way. 
Generally, the bunker emissions charge is more likely to reduce the trade of low-value high-
volume commodities from relatively distant sources, while encouraging trade of high-value low-
volume commodities. The carbon charge on bunker emissions also encourages trade and 
production of those commodities which do not rely on international transport services, such as 
non-ferrous metals or services.  
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As shown in Figure 5, the imposition of a carbon charge on bunker emissions is projected to 
slightly reduce global export volumes of coal, other mining products, crops and food, 
encouraging further processing before exporting. The magnitude of the decline in export 
volumes of these commodities is projected to be less than 0.6 percent relative to the baseline case 
in 2030. As these sectors begin to slow due to a decline in export demand, the release of some 
inputs used in their production will put downward pressure on commodity and primary input 
prices, lowering the unit cost of production for commodities that use international transport 
services less intensively. Consequently, exports of these high value-low volume commodities are 
expected to increase with a bunker emissions charges, relative to the reference case. Small 
increases in export volumes of iron and steel (about 0.2 percent), non-ferrous metals (about 0.1 
percent) and services (about 0.1 percent) are projected. Changes to exports in other sectors, 
including natural gas, manufacturing and food are negligible. Finally, the relative geographic 
isolation between trading partners will also affect the role of the bunker emissions charge in 
redistributing trade between countries. The projected negative impacts together account for the 
supply-side response. 
 
In sum, imposing a bunker emissions charge incurs costs for participating countries by reducing 
trade flows and diverting trade among commodities and across regions. However, as the results 
clearly indicate, the price effects are quite small due to either the supply response effects or the 
technological progress effects. Thus, its impact on trade is modest.  
 
Figure 5: Effects on trade patterns from a bunker emissions charge under the baseline scenario in 2030 (%) 
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Note: the change is expressed as the logarithm of change from CPRS–5 without a bunker 
emissions charge.  
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the scenario of collection by harbors of destination/origin, and both are less than that from the 
scenario of the benchmark scenario, and the gap is widening over time. This suggests that 
implementing a bunker emissions charge through collection by flag or by destination/origin tends 
to be less efficient than imposing the framework through a universal global framework in coping 
with bunker emissions.  
 
Figure 6: Global bunker emissions by different scenarios for imposing the framework 
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effects become larger. As is shown in Figure 7, the average import prices of major commodities 
increase more quickly under the two alternative scenarios than those under the benchmark 
scenario. Such a change is more likely to be driven by the strong trade diversion effect, plus the 
reduction in the supply response effects and the technological progress effects. This is because 
the countries and regions which are unwilling to flag for imposing a bunker emissions charge are 
usually developing countries and less efficient in production and transportation of all types of 
commodities. A bunker emissions charge by flag or by destination/origin is comparable to taxing 
the relatively more efficient producers to subsidize the less efficient ones and thus cause the 
misallocation of resources throughout the world.   
 
Figure 7: Response of import prices in different scenarios under a universal bunker charge 
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5. Pathway towards Implementing the Global Framework 
In the previous section, we discussed the economic benefits and costs related to imposing a 
bunker emissions charge, respectively. The bunker emissions charge was found to bring benefits 
by raising tax revenues and reducing the quantity of bunker emissions. It also induces costs by 
decreasing trade volumes and diverting trade. Yet, whether the international framework for a 
bunker emissions charge could be established depends on the net impact of the bunker emissions 
charge. This section combines the costs and benefits by looking at the change in GDP in 
response to the bunker emissions charge.  
 
5.1 The Global Bunker Emissions Charge and Net Economic Welfare Measure 
Based on the baseline scenario with no bunker emissions charge, the real GDP of each region 
will significantly increase by 2030 but the increases are unevenly distributed across regions. The 
increases in real GDP and global trade are driven mainly by the endogenous growth in 
population and investment and the exogenously technological progress. According to our 
projection, China will overtake the US and become the largest economy with real GDP reaching 
US$ 31.7 trillion, followed by the US (US$ 22.9 trillion), EU 25 countries (US$ 18.2 trillion), 
India (US$ 7.9 trillion), Japan (US$ 5.8 trillion) and Russia (US$ 4.7 billion) (Table 3). At the 
same time, global trade will grow more quickly than real GDP but the growth rate will slow 
down. Due to the rise of protectionism and the substantial weakening investment in fixed 
investment growth both in developed and developing countries, the ratio of global trade growth 
to world GDP has steadily fallen from a factor of 2.5 to 1.  
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Table 3: Annual GDP growth rate by region in 2030 
Country Name 
Without bunker 
emissions charge (%) 
With bunker emissions 
charge (%) 
US 2.00 1.99 
EU 25 1.47 1.47 
China 7.68 7.59 
Former Soviet Union 3.68 3.51 
Japan 0.79 0.80 
India 7.43 7.33 
Canada 1.79 1.77 
Australia 2.76 2.71 
Indonesia 6.01 5.89 
South Africa 4.65 4.55 
Other Southeast Asian Countries 4.21 4.19 
OPEC 4.67 4.57 
Rest of World 5.24 5.22 
Note: the estimation is made based on the assumptions of the baseline scenario. 
 
However, when implementing a bunker emissions charge, the annual growth rates for all regions 
tend to decline, though the change is modest in magnitude. By 2030, implementation of a bunker 
emissions charge is estimated to cause each country to lose US$5.31billion (in 2001 dollars) of 
gross national income. Of this amount, US$6.52 billion is accounted for by loss of GDP with a 
gain of US$ 1.21 billion from terms of trade improvement. 
  
Figures 8 illustrates the dynamic path of real GDP for selected regions when imposing a bunker 
emissions charge. Such a dynamic change in GDP reflects the net impact of the emissions charge 
on imports, exports and domestic production from a general equilibrium perspective.  
 
Figure 8: Real GDP under the basic scenario with a global bunker emissions charge 
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Note: the change is expressed as the change relative to the basic scenario without a bunker 
emissions charge. 
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volumes of low value coal and iron ore, the prices of which are expected to increase. In addition, 
China’s exports are relatively intensive in international transport services, thereby inducing a 
large adjustment in the Chinese economy with the imposition of bunker emissions charges.  
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Furthermore, these countries generally export high value-low volume goods from high-tech 
manufacturing. The impact of a bunker emissions charge on the prices of goods exported from 
the United States, Japan and the European Union is likely to be low compared with export 
competitors. Whether a country loses or gains in terms of real GDP, the changes are estimated to 
be very small.  
 
5.2 Revenue Redistribution Policy and Its Impact for Implementation 
It is widely believed that the way to redistribute the revenues from a bunker charge between 
countries and regions will affect the incentives for individual countries participating in the global 
framework for a bunker emissions charge. To access the impact of different redistribution 
policies on the welfare of each country, we designed three revenue distribution scenarios for 
simulation following the current policy debate in practice. These three scenarios include: (I) 
‘redistributing revenue according to the revenue collection’, (II) ‘redistributing revenues only to 
the developing countries according to their trade volume’, and (III) “redistributing revenue to all 
countries and regions evenly’.  
 
The simulation results are shown in Table 4, where column 1 provides the loss in GDP for each 
country and region due to a bunker emissions charge and columns 2-4 provide the gain in GDP 
from using different revenue redistribution policies.  
 
Table 4: Aggregate economic effects of a global bunker emissions charge and revenue 
redistribution in 2030 
Country Name 
Loss 
(GDP %) 
Revenue 
Distribution I 
Revenue  
Distribution 
Revenue  
Distribution 
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(GDP %) II (GDP %) III (GDP %) 
US -0.003 0.009 - 0.005 
EU 25 0.008 0.033 - 0.010 
China -0.061 0.009 0.030 0.009 
Former Soviet Union -0.039 0.008 - 0.038 
Japan 0.039 0.029 - 0.021 
India -0.091 0.004 0.067 0.039 
Canada -0.019 0.004 - 0.070 
Australia -0.045 0.006 - 0.121 
Indonesia -0.140 0.007 0.079 0.008 
South Africa -0.047 0.006 0.039 0.027 
Other Southeast Asian Countries -0.133 0.036 0.042 0.022 
OPEC -0.177 0.015 0.030 0.036 
Rest of World -0.096 0.022 0.056 0.012 
Note: the estimation is based on the assumptions of the baseline scenario. 
 
Without considering the refund in revenues from a bunker charge, the developing countries, such 
as China, India and Indonesia may have no economic incentives to participate in the global 
initiative since they may encounter greater losses in their economic growth compared to their 
developed counterparts. Nor is there much economic incentive for the developed countries, such 
as Australia and Canada, to participate into the global initiative. They, too, would face erosion in 
their economic growth because they have been exporting a large proportion of low-valued 
materials and resources with relatively high transportation costs.  
 
However, an international transfer from developed countries yielded additional gains from a 
bunker charge to developing countries, thereby helping to alleviate the situation and giving all 
countries and regions an incentive to participate in a global bunker emissions charge  
 
When comparing the net impacts of the three revenue redistribution policies, we have reason to 
believe that policy II is superior to policies I and III in facilitating the establishment of the global 
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framework for a bunker emissions charge. This is because policy II gives more compensation to 
the developing countries, which suffer from more losses as a result of the implementation of a 
bunker emissions charge. In contrast, policies I and II give more or equal benefits to the 
developed countries, which are more likely to benefit from the implementation of a bunker 
emissions charge.  
 
Even without economic benefits, the developed countries may have more political willingness to 
participate in a global bunkers emissions charge than the developing countries since they have 
put more emphasis on environmental issues than economic development.  
 
5.3 Beyond Economic Costs and Benefits: Long-term Competitiveness Analysis 
Although the GDP measure simplifies the cost-benefit analysis, it will not inform us about the 
long-term impact of imposing a bunker emissions charge. In practice, many countries care more 
about comparative advantage or competitiveness than GDP growth. Thus, whether the 
international framework for a bunker emissions charge could be established also depends on how 
it will alter the competitive and comparative advantage positions of trading partners throughout 
the world. 
 
If a country has a comparative advantage in a commodity, it will appear prominent in the 
country’s export commodities bundle. In other words, its share in the total value of exports will 
remain high. Using this method, we examine the change in shares due to the implementation of a 
bunker emissions charge under the baseline scenario and present the results in Table 5. This 
provides a simple way to examine changes in the revealed comparative advantage position of 
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commodities for each country. Generally, we show that implementing a bunker emissions charge 
shifts the commodity distribution of comparative advantage position in all countries, but the 
impact is relatively small.  
 
Table 5: Estimated change in share of commodity in total value of exports from a country/region under the basic 
scenario in 2030 (unit: percentage) 
  USA EU 25 CHN FSU JPN IND CAN AUS IDN SAF OAS OPEC ROW 
Coal -0.1 1.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
Gas -0.2 0.1 0.7 0 0.4 1 0 0 2.5 0.4 1.9 0.3 0.3 
Iron and Steel 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.4 -0.5 0.7 -0.1 0 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0 
Non-ferrous metals 0.1 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 -0.6 0.6 0 
Chemicals, rubbers 
and plastics 
-0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0 0 -0.1 0.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
Other mining 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0 -0.7 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0 
Non-metallic minerals -0.1 0 0.2 0.7 0.2 -1.2 0.8 1 -0.1 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 
Manufacturing 0.1 -0.1 -1 0 0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -1.3 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 
Crops 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.8 0.1 -0.4 0 
Food -0.3 -0.3 0 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 0 -0.3 
Services 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 
 
To examine whether a country’s competitive position would be adversely affected by the 
inclusion of bunker emissions in the scope of a global carbon charge, the share of each 
commodity in the global trade is calculated and reported for the year 2030 in Table 6. The key 
point to note is that if a country remains competitive, its market share in the global value of trade 
in the commodity will not decline. The implication is that the impact of a bunker emissions 
charge on the transport cost for each commodity is not projected to be significant for the carbon 
charge paths modelled. Overall, the extension of a carbon charge to cover international bunker 
emissions is not projected to significantly alter the value of individual commodity exports in all 
regions. Any differences are very small.   
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Table 6: Estimated change in share of various commodities in global trade of the same commodity under the basic 
scenario in 2030 (unit: percentage) 
  USA EU25 CHN FSU JPN IND CAN AUS IDN SAF OAS OPEC ROW 
Coal -0.3 1.5 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 1.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 
Gas -1.1 -0.6 0.9 -0.8 -0.8 0.7 -0.6 -0.5 2.7 -0.5 1.2 -0.5 -0.4 
Iron and Steel -0.3 -0.1 1.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
Non-ferrous 
 metals 
-0.3 -0.4 1.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.4 0.1 0.2 1.5 0.4 -0.8 0.3 -0.2 
Chemicals,  
rubbers  
and plastics 
-0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 -0.4 0.4 0 0.5 0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 
Other mining -0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -1.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.3 0.8 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 0 
Non-metallic  
minerals 
-0.5 -0.1 0.9 0.5 -0.4 -1 0.7 1 0.7 -0.1 -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 
Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 -0.3 0 0 0.2 -0.3 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Crops 0 -0.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 0 1.1 -0.9 0.2 -0.5 0 
Food -0.4 -0.2 1 0.1 -0.7 0.1 0 -0.1 0.8 -0.6 0 -0.1 -0.3 
Services -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.9 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, bunker emissions are not included in the national inventory of GHG 
emissions. As a result, these emissions are excluded from the scope of carbon pricing, following 
any agreement on national emissions restrictions. With the rapid expansion of international trade 
and the associated increased consumption of bunker fuels, how to restrict bunker emissions has 
become an important public concern. 
 
To date, there have been many proposals to include bunker emissions within the scope of carbon 
pricing, among which a global bunker emissions charge is considered as a possible way. 
However, it is difficult for a global climate policy framework to gain support from both 
developed and developing countries. As a carbon charge on bunker fuel emissions would 
increase economic costs through reducing trade flows and changing trade patterns, developing 
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countries and the countries that are located some distance from their trading partners are 
legitimately concerned about the possible negative income and competitive effects. Therefore, 
understanding the economic impacts of a bunker emissions charge can assist different countries 
commit to a global deal. However, the existing literature seldom considers the general 
equilibrium effects and the inequalities that could result from a global bunker emissions charge. 
 
This study employed a dynamic CGE model to quantify the economic impacts of implementing a 
global bunker emissions charge. The economic impacts of a global bunker emissions charge on 
global trade volume and trade flows, as well as the comparative production advantage and 
competitiveness of each country were all assessed.  
 
We found that including bunker emissions in a standard CPRS–5 environment would have a very 
small impact on global trade and production. Its impact on real GDP was estimated to be less 
than -0.5 percent. This study also confirms that the magnitudes of any negative effects are small, 
since the competitive and comparative advantages of a country (particularly developing countries) 
are unlikely to be affected by the inclusion of bunker emissions in the carbon pricing 
environments. Using a transparent and simple revenue redistribution mechanism, we demonstrate 
that less developed countries will not be disadvantaged when the revenue distribution mechanism 
is properly designed. 
 
Finally, our study informs the policy debate regarding the control of marine transport emissions. 
The limited economic impact of a bunker emissions charge implies that a global bunker 
emissions charge is economically feasible and desirable when compared to the benefits from 
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emissions reduction. Designing a mechanism to redistribute revenues from the global emissions 
charge from developed countries to developing countries could encourage the participation of 
more countries. While the proposal needs some level of clarification from developed countries, it 
is consistent with the principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ that developed 
countries may shoulder more responsibility in mitigating climate change.    
 
Our analysis aims to provide an analytical framework to support political debates. It does not 
make actual decisions, such as allocation of emissions, which is politically controversial and 
beyond the scope of this paper. The international community must build consensus through 
political dialogue, and also conduct further joint technical studies similar to this.  
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Appendix: Dynamic Path for Implementing the Global Framework 
Two important areas of uncertainty related to the implementation of a bunker emissions 
charge are analyzed in this appendix: marine fuel price uncertainty and carbon charge 
uncertainty. Each of the sensitivity analyses results is presented, only for simplicity, for real GDP 
and real GNP. 
 
The central carbon charge scenario with and without imposing carbon levies on bunker 
emissions was conducted by altering the assumptions regarding the projected changes in 
marine fuel prices. The central scenario used price projection for reference. The global impact 
on real GNP and GDP when extending a carbon charge to bunker emissions under a higher fuel 
price path is presented in Table A1. There is little difference in the macroeconomic impacts of a 
bunker charge under the alternative marine fuel price assumptions. This aligns to expectations 
that fuel price assumptions are built into all carbon charge scenarios with or without a bunker 
charge. Hence, the impact of different bunker charge decisions is mostly negligible. For this 
reason, other commodity specific results are not presented. 
 
Table B1: Estimated global macroeconomic effects in 2030 of a bunker charge under CPRS–5 
scenario with alternative marine fuel price assumptions (unit: percentage) 
 Central price path (%) High price path (%) 
Real GDP -0.04 -0.05 
Real GNP -0.19 -0.20 
 
The results were replicated under two additional carbon charge paths, each with and without a 
bunker charge. The first of the supplementary carbon charge paths commences 45 percent 
below and the second commences at 40 percent above the starting carbon charge consistent 
with the CPRS–5 scenario. Both carbon charge paths increase at the same rate as the CPRS–5 
carbon charge rises. Some key macroeconomic results under these scenarios are compared in 
Table A2. The results are shown relative to the equivalent carbon charge scenario, without a 
bunker fuel charge. 
 
Table B2: Estimated macroeconomic effects of a global bunker fuel charge in 2030 – 
sensitivity to the carbon charge path (unit: percentage) 
 Low carbon charge path 
(%)  
Central carbon charge path 
(CPRS–5) (%) 
High carbon charge path 
(%) 
Global Real GDP -0.023 -0.045 -0.058 
Global Real GNP -0.102 -0.186 -0.250 
 
The results in Table A2 suggest that the implementation of a bunker charge under higher 
carbon charge paths results in a larger fall in global real GDP and real GNP. The fall in the real 
GNP is much more pronounced than the fall in real GDP, mainly because GNP takes into 
account the terms of trade losses and income transfers associated with a bunker charge. 
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